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ABSTRACT
In United States v. Jeffries, the Sixth Circuit upheld a
defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for
transmitting a threat through interstate commerce after the
defendant posted a music video on YouTube. The video
threatened a local judge presiding over the defendant’s
child custody proceedings. Circuits have split on whether
§ 875(c) and other similar federal threat statutes require
the defendant to possess a subjective intent to threaten.
This Article argues that the “true threat” test courts use to
apply § 875(c) essentially incorporates a subjective intent
to threaten. The Article then applies the subjective intent
requirement to YouTube videos, using the reasoning in
United States v. Alkhabaz as a model.
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INTRODUCTION
When does a YouTube video constitute a criminal threat? The
Sixth Circuit recently held that a defendant who posted an original
music video on YouTube violated a federal threat statute. 1 The
video contained threatening comments directed at a local judge,
and referenced the defendant’s upcoming court date in a custody
case. Lyrics in the video included “take my child and I’ll take your
life” and “July the 14th is the last time I'm goin' to court.” 2 The
court upheld the defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c),
which criminalizes conveying a threat to injure or kidnap a person
through interstate commerce. 3
1

United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 59, 187 L. Ed. 2d 25 (2013).
2
Id. at 475–76.
3
Id. at 483.
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Using § 875(c) to prosecute threats made in YouTube videos
raises interesting First Amendment concerns. Unlike other
interstate communications, such as telephone calls, YouTube
videos and similar posts on other forms of social media are
generally not directed at specific individuals. Thus, an application
of criminal liability to YouTube videos may have a particularly
chilling effect on public speech.
This Article argues that a YouTube video can only constitute a
“true threat” if its creator had a subjective intent to threaten.
Subjective intent to threaten is demonstrated by evidence that the
video was disseminated to the threatened individual or that the
threat was made to further a purpose through intimidation.
Requiring subjective intent reduces the potential chilling effect of
§ 875(c) by ensuring that only threats directed at specific
individuals or groups are subject to liability.
I. CIRCUIT SPLIT ON REQUISITE MENS REA
FOR 18 U.S.C. § 875(C)
The text of § 875(c) contains no language about the requisite
mens rea. The statute provides: “whoever transmits in interstate or
foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to
kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.” 4 Despite this broad language, courts have not
interpreted § 875(c) as a strict liability offense, noting the
absurdity of the results and the general common law preference for
mens rea requirements in criminal statutes. 5
4 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). Under a plain language interpretation,
YouTube could face liability for “transmit[ting]” a threat uploaded by a user.
The First Amendment, however, prohibits strict liability for statutes
criminalizing speech. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154–55, 80 S. Ct.
215, 4 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1959) (holding a statute imposing strict liability on
booksellers for possessing obscene material impermissibly chilled protected
speech).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059, 1063 (4th Cir. 1994)
(“although section 875(c) contains no explicit mens rea element, the statute is
not … a strict liability offense.”); United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777,
782 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir.
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Although courts agree that a violation of § 875(c) is not a strict
liability offense, they disagree about the requisite mens rea. Courts
have addressed two questions about § 875(c)’s mens rea
requirements. The first is whether the defendant must intend to
carry out the threat or simply intend to make the threat. Courts
have held that only intent to threaten is required, or conversely that
intent to carry out the threat is not required. 6
The second mens rea issue is whether the intent to threaten
must be objective or subjective. Phrased differently, the issue is
whether the communication must be a threat when viewed from the
perspective of the defendant (subjective intent) or from the
perspective of a reasonable person (objective intent). Currently,
only the Ninth Circuit requires subjective intent. 7 Other circuits
require only objective intent. 8 However, some circuits, such as the
Sixth Circuit, functionally require subjective intent through the
application of the true threat test.
The use of differing terminology further complicates the
disagreement among the circuits. Courts frame the mens rea issues
described above using the terms “general intent,” “specific intent,”
“subjective intent,” and “objective intent.” 9 These terms are used
interchangeably, with “general intent” being synonymous with

1992) (transmission of threat cannot be inadvertent).
6 See, e.g., Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 478; United States v. Lincoln, 589 F.2d
379, 381 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th
Cir. 1978).
7 See United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d
1113 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a conviction required both objective and
subjective intent in a case involving statements that encouraged killing Barack
Obama, then a presidential candidate, that were posted in an online forum).
8 See, e.g., United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding
that § 875(c) only requires the defendant to intentionally send communication,
not intentionally threaten); United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 332 (8th Cir. 2011)
(holding that objective test measures whether a reasonable observer would find
the communication conveyed intent to cause harm); United States v. Alkhabaz,
104 F.3d 1493, 1496 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a subjective standard).
9 Karen Rosenfield, Note, Redefining the Question: Applying a
Hierarchical Structure to the Mens Rea Requirement for Section 875(c), 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1846 (2008).
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“objective intent,” and “specific intent” with “subjective intent.” 10
For the sake of clarity, this Article will only use the terms
“subjective intent” and “objective intent.”
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES THAT § 875(C) APPLY
ONLY TO “TRUE THREATS”
The Supreme Court has held that threat statutes criminalize
pure speech. 11 Therefore, § 875(c) “must be interpreted with the
commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind.”12 Threats are
one of the limited categories of pure speech that the First
Amendment does not protect. 13 However, a statute prohibiting
threats must distinguish true threats from “constitutionally
protected speech.” 14 A statute that does not make this distinction
chills protected speech through the threat of prosecution. 15
First Amendment analysis of criminal threat statutes hinges on
whether the prohibited speech is a true threat. 16 For a threat to be a
true threat, it must “communicate a serious expression of an intent
to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals.” 17
Various circuit courts have further developed the true threat
test in the context of § 875(c) and related federal statutes. This test
essentially incorporates the subjective intent test applied by the
Ninth Circuit. This incorporation of subjective intent is evident
from comparing two cases in the Sixth Circuit.

10 Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 485 (Sutton, J., dubitante) (citing DeAndino, 958
F.2d at 148).
11 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S. Ct. 1399, 22 L. Ed. 2d
664 (1969).
12 Id.
13 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 155 L. Ed. 2d
535 (2003).
14 Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
15 Black, 538 U.S. at 365.
16 Watts, 394 U.S. at 708; Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60.
17 Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
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III. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT AND TRUE THREAT ANALYSIS
The Sixth Circuit explicitly rejects any subjective intent
requirement under § 875(c).18 However, the circuit applies a true
threat analysis in all § 875(c) cases.19 This analysis incorporates
subjective features. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of §
875(c) is functionally identical to the Ninth Circuit’s approach.
Comparing the cases United States v. Jeffries and United States v.
Alkhabaz demonstrates this.
A. United States v. Jeffries
In Jeffries, the defendant filmed himself performing an original
song entitled “Daughter’s Love,” and uploaded the video to
YouTube. The song described Jeffries’ relationship with his
daughter and his ongoing legal dispute over visitation rights.
Jeffries created the video shortly before a hearing to determine
whether his unsupervised visits should continue. The song
contained several passages apparently aimed at the judge who was
presiding over the custody case and referenced the defendant’s
upcoming hearing. Among these passages was the following:
Take my child and I'll take your life. I'm not
kidding, judge, you better listen to me. I killed a
man downrange in war. I have nothing against you,
but I'm tellin' you this better be the last court date
. . . so July the 14th is the last time I'm goin' to
court. Believe that. Believe that, or I'll come after
you after court. Believe that.
Jeffries ended the video by looking into the camera and stating
I can shoot you. I can kill you. I can f____ you. Be
my friend. Do something right. Serve my daughter.
Yeah, look at that, that's the evil. You better keep
me on God's side. Do the right thing July 14th.
18

United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1496 (6th Cir. 1997).
United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 2012); Alkhabaz,
104 F.3d at 1496.
19
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After uploading the video, the defendant sent links to the video
to several people involved with the case, encouraging them to
share the video with “the Judge.” After the jury convicted Jeffries
of violating § 875(c), he appealed on the grounds that the trial
judge had refused to instruct the jury on a subjective intent
requirement. The Sixth Circuit upheld the trial court’s instruction,
holding that the only requirement was that a reasonable observer
would consider the threat a true threat.
B. United States v. Alkhabaz
In an earlier case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an
indictment where the defendant had exchanged several emails with
another unknown defendant. 20 The emails discussed a shared
sexual interest in torture and rape. 21 The case involved a fictional
story that the defendant Alkhabaz wrote about the rape and murder
of one of his classmates. 22 Alkhabaz emailed the story to the other
defendant and also posted the story to a Usenet group called
alt.sex.stories. 23 Alkhabaz did not attempt to send the story to the
classmate about whom he wrote the story. However, another
classmate saw the story and reported it to the school authorities
who began the investigation.
The case was appealed after the district court dismissed the
indictment on First Amendment grounds for failing to allege a true
threat. 24 The Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the
communication was not a true threat, although ostensibly doing so
on statutory grounds, rather than basing its holding on the First
Amendment. 25
The court held that § 875(c) required that the threat be made
“to effect some change or achieve some goal through
intimidation.” 26 Even if a reasonable observer could find that the
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1493 (6th Cir. 1997).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1496.
Id. at 1495.
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story was a “serious expressio[n] of an intention to inflict bodily
harm,” the story was not meant to use intimidation to further that
purpose. 27 Instead, the story was sent “to foster a friendship based
on shared sexual fantasies.” 28
C. Distinguishing Alkhabaz from Jeffries
Alkhabaz and Jeffries shared several important features, yet
produced different results. Posting a fictional story to a Usenet
group is in many respects similar to posting a video on YouTube.
Both were posted on publicly accessible parts of the Internet. 29
Moreover, both forms of communication differed from emails and
phone calls in that they do not inherently target specific recipients.
In the abstract, the cases involved similar communications.
It is the subjective purpose behind each communication that
differentiates Alkhabaz from Jeffries. Two key facts in Jeffries led
the court to consider the YouTube video a true threat, unlike the
story in Alkhabaz. First, while Alkhabaz merely posted his story
without attempting to specifically communicate it to the threatened
individual, Jeffries posted his video and then sent links to several
people involved with the case. This fact by itself might not have
been determinative, as the Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected a test
based on whether the threat was communicated to the threatened
party. 30 However, the fact that Jeffries made an effort to
communicate with the judge was evidence that he was trying to
effect a change through intimidation.31
The second distinguishing fact was the actual content of the
two communications. Jeffries clearly indicated a demand in his
video. The video not only contained threats to the judge but also
had frequent and specific references to the upcoming court date
and urged the judge to “do the right thing.” 32 These statements
27 Id. at 1496.
28 Id.
29
United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1995) aff'd
sub nom., United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
30
Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1494–95.
31
United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 481 (6th Cir. 2012).
32
Id. at 476–77.
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were evidence that Jeffries was asking the judge to rule in his favor
at the hearing. 33 In contrast, Alkhabaz’s story contained no
indication that he was trying to obtain something by
communicating a threat. 34
Therefore, because Jeffries’ video included a request and was
disseminated in an attempt to reach the judicial officer, it was
considered a true threat. In contrast, Alkhabaz’s story did not
contain a demand or request and was only posted online and
emailed to an unrelated third party; it therefore lacked the requisite
intent to be a true threat.
D. The Sixth Circuit’s True Threat Test Combines Subjective and
Objective Standards
The true threat test, as applied in Jeffries, is substantially
similar to a subjective intent requirement. The test applied by the
court is whether a reasonable person would perceive the
communication as a true threat. 35
The test can be broken into two elements, although the Sixth
Circuit does not frame it in this manner. The first step is to
determine whether the threat is a true threat, as required by the
First Amendment in Watts v. United States. 36 The second step is to
consider whether a reasonable person would perceive the
communication as a serious threat to inflict bodily harm. A threat
must satisfy both steps to sustain a conviction.
The true threat analysis employed by the Sixth Circuit
incorporates several subjective factors. Alkhabaz’s use of the test
asks whether the threat was made to further a purpose or goal. 37
And the jury instruction in Jeffries, although explicitly stating that
there was no subjective intent requirement, told the jury to
consider whether a reasonable person would find that “the
communication was done to effect some change or achieve some

33

Id. at 481.
Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1496.
35
Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 478.
36
394 U.S. 705, 708, 89 S. Ct. 1399, 22 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1969).
37
Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1495.
34
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goal through intimidation.” 38 Whether the threat was made to
achieve a goal considers the defendant’s subjective intent.
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit requires objective proof of subjective
intent. This approach is not substantively different from simply
requiring subjective intent.
Intent is by its very nature subjective. But this fact does not
mean that evidence of intent must be subjective. For example, in
many areas of criminal law, the jury can find intent without any
subjective evidence because it can infer intent from objective
evidence. 39 If a defendant uses a deadly weapon on a victim, the
jury may infer an intent to kill, even absent any subjective
evidence about the defendant’s state of mind. 40 Accordingly,
subjective intent is often proven with objective evidence.
Therefore, despite the Sixth Circuit’s stated rejections of the Ninth
Circuit’s subjective intent requirement, 41 in practice the two tests
lead to the same results in most situations.
IV. APPLYING SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE INTENT
REQUIREMENTS TO YOUTUBE VIDEOS
Subjective and objective intent requirements often lead to the
same outcome. If a communication is objectively threatening, it is
more likely that the communication was intended to be a threat.
And if there is evidence that the creator of the communication
intended to threaten the recipient, it is more likely that the message
will be viewed as objectively threatening.
However, a subjective intent requirement prevents § 875(c)
from chilling protected speech. With this requirement, § 875(c)
only reaches threats directed at specific individuals or groups. And
YouTube users may submit content that contains threatening
language without fear of liability, as it is not directed at specific
individuals. So what do these requirements mean for threats posted
on widely broadcast Internet channels such as YouTube?
38

Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 477.
See 1 BARBARA E. BERGMAN, NANCY HOLLANDER & THERESA M.
DUNCAN, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 3:17 (15th ed. 2013).
40
Id.
41
Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1496.
39
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A. Objective Intent Requirement
Holding the threat to an objective standard means that the
language of the threat must be sufficiently threatening, given the
context, that a reasonable observer would find it to be a serious
expression of an intent to cause harm. For example, if a YouTube
video contains only an innocuous message, the video would not
meet the objective standard, regardless of the creator’s intent. But
if the content of the communication is threatening, under a purely
objective standard, the defendant’s testimony about his intentions
would not be relevant.
B. Subjective Intent Requirement
Requiring subjective intent means that there must be evidence
that the creator of the message intended to threaten. This was the
situation in Alkhabaz, where the content of the defendant’s story
met the objective standard but the circumstances demonstrated that
he did not send the communication in order to further a purpose
through intimidation. 42 In terms of a YouTube video, this means
that a video may contain threatening language as long as there is
no evidence that the video’s creator intended to threaten someone.
Jeffries indicates that a video directed toward the threatened
individual, or circumstances, such as demands for specific action,
that show intent to threaten, are evidence of subjective intent.
C. Practical Differences Between the Sixth and Ninth Circuit
Approaches.
The practical differences between the approaches of the two
circuits are evidentiary, not in the substance of what a conviction
requires. But the Sixth Circuit’s true threat analysis limits even
these evidentiary differences. In the Ninth Circuit, a defendant’s
statements about his intent will always be relevant in determining
whether the communication was a threat. In the Sixth Circuit, the
defendant’s testimony regarding his intent will have less relevance,
42

Id.
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though it could still be relevant when determining whether the
threat was intended to achieve a goal or further a purpose.
CONCLUSION
While the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit use ostensibly
different tests when analyzing cases under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the
elements of each test are essentially the same. The Ninth Circuit
requires both subjective and objective intent to threaten in order to
uphold a conviction. The Sixth Circuit not only requires objective
intent, but also requires the threat to be a true threat, and this true
threat test incorporates analysis of subjective intent to threaten.
Therefore, there is no substantive difference between the
requirements for a § 875(c) conviction under the ostensibly
different tests of the Ninth and Sixth Circuits. In either circuit, the
government must prove both objective expression of serious intent
to cause bodily harm and subjective intent to threaten.
In the context of a YouTube video or other widely broadcast
communication, § 875(c) is violated only when there is evidence
that its creator had a subjective intent to threaten. In the YouTube
context, evidence of subjective intent can be efforts to direct the
video at a specific individual or group, or to accomplish a goal
through intimidation. This subjective requirement mitigates
potential chilling effects on speech while allowing the government
to prosecute legitimate threats.
PRACTICE POINTERS


When advising clients about potential criminal liability for
YouTube videos or similar communications, keep in mind
both the objective and subjective requirements. A client’s
video may be objectively threatening but not directed at
any individual, and thus not subject to liability.



When practicing in the Sixth Circuit, frame any defense
based on lack of subjective intent to threaten in terms of a
true threat analysis. The court is more likely to reject an
argument framed around the subjective intent requirement.

